Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines by Stith, Kate & Cabranes, Jose A.
Copyright 1997 by Northwestern University, School of Law Printed in U.S.A.
Northwestern University Law Review Vol. 91, No. 4
JUDGING UNDER THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Kate Stith* & Josi A. Cabranes**
I. SENTENCING BEFORE THE GUIDELINES ................. 1248
A. The Judge's Sentencing Authority .................. 1248
B. The Significance of the Sentencing Ritual .......... 1252
II. SENTENCING UNDER THE GUIDELINES .................. 1254
A. The New Role of the Judge ......................... 1254
B. The New Role of the Probation Officer ............ 1256
C. The New Ritual ..................................... 1263
III. THE NEW JURISPRUDENCE .............................. 1266
A. Guidelines Fact-Finding: Complex, Obscure, and
Prolonged ........................................... 1266
B. The Insignificance of Guidelines Jurisprudence ..... 1270
1. The Guidelines as Diktats ...................... 1271
2. New Concepts, New Confusion ................. 1272
3. The Hegemony of the Sentencing Commission. 1274
IV. THE PRIMACY OF THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AFTER
K ooN ................................................... 1277
V. CONCLUSION ............................................ 1282
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 sought to bring consistency,
coherence, and accountability to a federal sentencing process that was
deficient in these respects. Requiring sentencing judges to explain
their decisions and permitting appellate review were, in our view,
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genuine accomplishments of the Act.1 Unfortunately, the potential
contributions of these legislative achievements have been arrested by
the implementation of a system of complex and rigid sentencing rules
devised by an administrative agency in Washington. Here, we discuss
two unintended consequences of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 2
First, the traditional sentencing ritual has lost much of its moral force
and significance. Second, both sentencing judges and appellate judges
have been denied the opportunity to develop a principled sentencing
jurisprudence.
I. SENTENCING BEFORE THE GUIDELINES
A. The Judge's Sentencing Authority
For two centuries, trial judges in the American federal system
bore nearly the full burden of achieving a just sentence within the
maxima set by statute.3 While other actors participated in the sen-
tencing process, the trial judge retained ultimate discretionary author-
ity to fashion the sentence. In this century, the judge shared
sentencing responsibility with parole officials in cases of imprison-
ment, but in the federal system the influence of these officials was
limited. Federal parole policies required that most federal prisoners
serve between one-third and two-thirds of their nominal-that is, ju-
dicially imposed-prison sentences.4 Mindful of the relevant parole
parameters, the federal trial judge was able to exercise considerable
control over the actual amount of prison time that would be served.
Moreover, since the mid-1970s, when federal parole authorities issued
their first set of parole guidelines, 5 the impact of parole on the length
of prison terms had arguably been more apparent than real. As long
1 Jos6 A. Cabranes, A Failed Utopian Experiment, NAT'L L.J., July 27, 1992, at 17; Kate
Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. RsV. 223, 252-53 & n.178 (1993).
2 In the larger project from which this article is drawn, we discuss the genesis of the
Guidelines, consider their consequences in greater depth, and propose avenues for corrective
action.
3 As we explore at greater length in the project from which this article is adapted, federal
criminal statutes since the founding of the Republic have generally stated only maximum permis-
sible fines and terms of imprisonment, thus permitting the judge to sentence to any lesser term.
4 The rate of "good time" that prisoners could earn off their sentences was set at 10 days per
month in 1910 and remained at that rate until the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 4161 (West 1985), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II,
§§ 218(a)(4), 235, 98 Stat. 2027, 2031. No offender could be released until he had served at least
one-third of his nominal sentence unless the judge at the time of sentencing specified earlier
eligibility for parole. See Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, § 1, 36 Stat. 819, 819 (providing for the
parole of United States prisoners) (subsequently codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 4202-4208 (West
1985)), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, §§ 218(a)(4),
235, 98 Stat. 2027, 2031.
5 Guidelines were issued by the United States Board of Parole in late 1973. See Parole
Policy Guidelines, 38 Fed. Reg. 31,942 (1973). Congress reorganized parole in 1976 and re-
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as the federal Probation Office's presentence report informed the sen-
tencing judge of the projected effect of parole guidelines on the
judge's sentence, the judge was in a position to decide the approxi-
mate length of any particular term of imprisonment.
Probation officers also played a substantial role at sentencing, but
they facilitated, rather than diminished, the sentencing authority of
the court. The probation officer in the federal system is an employee
of the judicial branch, and traditionally has acted as a confidential ad-
viser to the court. In the discretionary sentencing era, the officer's
most important function was to prepare a presentence report for the
judge, a copy of which (with the exception of a confidential sentencing
recommendation to the judge) was provided to the prosecutor and to
the defense prior to the sentencing hearing.6 In recent decades, a typi-
cal report included summaries of both the prosecutor's and the de-
fendant's versions of the offense, information on the disposition of the
cases of codefendants, and information on the application of the pa-
role guidelines to the case at hand. But the largest section of the
presentence report dealt with the personal history and circumstances
of the defendant: family background, education, military service, work
history, criminal record, dependents, and activities (good and bad) in
the community. Prior to the implementation of the Sentencing Guide-
lines, the official instructions to probation officers explained that the
presentence report's "primary purpose is to aid the court in determin-
ing the appropriate sentence," and required that the report include
"[a]n assessment of the problems of the defendant and a consideration
for the safety of the community."'7 The final section of the report, not
released to either the government or the defendant, contained the
probation officer's recommendation to the judge of an appropriate
quired the new United States Parole Commission to issue parole guidelines. See Parole Com-
mission and Reorganization Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 219, 220 (repealed 1984).
6 Prior to 1974, presentence reports were prepared only upon request of the sentencing
judge. In 1974, Rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was amended to require a
report in nearly every case, unless the defendant waived its preparation. FED. R. CRIM. P.
32(c)(1) (subsequently amended). Another amendment required disclosure of the report to the
defendant upon request. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A) (subsequently amended).
7 PROBATION Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, PUB. No. 105, THE PRESENTENCE
INVEsTIGATION REPORT 1 (1978). Prior instructions from the Probation Division in Washington
had stressed even more strongly the role of "social work." The first set of instructions to federal
probation officers stated that the primary object of the presentence report "is to focus light on
the character and personality of the defendant, to offer insight into his personality needs, to
discover those factors underlying the specific offense and his conduct in general." RICHARD A.
CHAPPELL & VICTOR H. EVJEN, THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 1 (Probation Div.,
Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Pub. No. 101, 1943). As the rehabilitative ideal declined, the
instructions to probation officers concentrated less on the need for social diagnosis of the de-
fendant's needs and problems. See Sharon M. Bunzel, Note, The Probation Officer and the




HeinOnline -- 91 Nw. U. L. Rev.  1249 1996-1997
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
sentence. 8 The probation officer's major threshold recommendation,
in many cases, dealt with the issue of whether the defendant should
receive a prison sentence or probation.9 In the event that a period of
imprisonment was recommended, the probation officer would suggest
a particular term, based in part on the national sentencing statistics
available for the offense in question, as well as on the officer's in-
formed judgment. But the role of the probation officer in sentencing
was purely advisory, in both theory and practice.
The pre-Guidelines roles of the prosecutor and the defense attor-
ney at a federal sentence hearing varied widely, but they never ap-
proached the significance of the judge's role. We explore elsewhere
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, both before and during the
Guidelines era.10 For now it is enough to note that in many districts,
including those with which we are most familiar, prosecutors generally
refrained from recommending a specific sentence to the judge, and the
judge would neither elicit nor condone such recommendations. In
other districts, prosecutors could and would forcefully argue for a sig-
nificant term of imprisonment, or they might urge a lenient disposi-
tion, perhaps joining in a defendant's request for a term of
probation." In a case where the defendant had provided useful infor-
mation to law enforcement officials concerning the criminal activities
of others, the defense and the prosecutor might each describe to the
judge the nature and significance of this cooperation.
Except for the rare occasion in which a judge accepted a plea of
guilty and sentenced on the basis of a binding sentence agreement
between the parties,12 the federal sentencing judge exercised extraor-
dinarily broad discretion over the nature and magnitude of the sen-
tence. The judge might, or might not, take into account the
8 See PROBATION Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, PUB. No. 105, THE PRESENTENCE
INVESTIGATION REPORT 6 (1978).
9 Prior to the Sentencing Guidelines, more than half of all federal defendants received no
custodial sentence, but instead were released on probation. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 1989
ANN. REP. app. B, tbl.B-7 (1989).
10 See STITH & CABRANES, supra note *
11 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1)(B) governs both pleas in which the prosecutor promises to
"recommend" a sentence and pleas in which the prosecutor agrees not to oppose the defendant's
requests.
12 Although many state systems permit prosecutors and defendants to agree on a particular
sentence as part of a plea-bargain, such sentence-bargains were highly unusual in the federal
system. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do permit the parties in a criminal case to
agree to a specific sentence, which is "binding" if the judge agrees to accept the plea agreement.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1)(C). There is general consensus that in federal court, very few cases
have proceeded under this rule. See, e.g., United States v. Pimentel, 932 F.2d 1029, 1033-34 (2d
Cir. 1991) (noting prosecutorial reluctance to plea bargain based on a particular sentence); John
Gleeson, Sentence Bargaining Under the Guidelines, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 314, 316 (1996).
There appear to be no statistics delineating the subdivision of Federal Rule 11(e) under which
pleas of guilty are accepted, either before the Guidelines or under the Guidelines regime.
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defendant's cooperation and adjust the sentence accordingly. The
judge might impose a short sentence of imprisonment combined with
probation, or might impose the maximum jail time permitted by stat-
ute. In theory and in practice, the burden of determining the sentence
fell almost entirely on the trial judge.
This virtually unreviewable authority13 was relatively unusual for
a federal trial judge. While many issues that arise in criminal and civil
cases are left to the discretion of the trial judge, most of these issues
are ultimately reviewable by the appellate courts. Only in the prelimi-
nary stages of a civil case-in the management of the discovery pro-
cess and other pretrial arrangements-does a federal trial judge
exercise comparable authority, and even there the judge is guided by
articulated legal principles and standards. The judge's discretionary
decisions during a trial may be appealed, and possibly reversed if the
judge is found to have "abused" his discretion. 14 This "abuse of dis-
cretion" standard applies to a variety of rulings that trial judges rou-
tinely make.15 What made sentencing authority truly extraordinary
13 Callis in 1622 called this discretio specialis because the discretionary decision itself "is the
absolute judge of the cause, and gives the rule." R. CALLIS, UPON THE STATUTE OF SEWERS 113
(1622), quoted in ROSEMARY PATTENDEN, THE JUDGE, DISCRETION AND THE CRIMINAL TRIAL
4 (1982).
14 See JACK WEINSTEIN ET AL., WEINSTEIN ON EVIDENCE 401101], at 401-08 (1989) (ex-
plaining that "[d]iscretion means that a trial judge has wide scope for decision in situations
where unpredictable, unique and incalculable factors are at work") (internal quotations
omitted).
15 In an early 1980s survey of two volumes of the Federal Reporter, Judge Joseph Sneed of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that one-quarter of all federal appel-
late decisions involved matters committed to the discretion of the trial court; the courts ap-
proved the exercise of discretion more than two-thirds of the time. Joseph Sneed, Trial Court
Discretion: Exercise by Trial Courts and Review by Appellate Courts (Presentation Before the
Judges of the Second Circuit, 1982) (on file with authors).
The situations in civil and criminal cases in which a federal trial judge exercises informed
judgment subject to appellate review for abuse of discretion are many and varied, and deeply
affect the lives and property of real people. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, for
instance, advises that relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury."
This is a broad and inevitably subjective standard of exclusion, which gives a judge great discre-
tion to weigh the particular circumstances confronted at trial. But the judge's evidentiary rulings
are appealable and may be reversed if the appellate court finds them to be arbitrary, inexplica-
ble, or contrary to binding precedent. In addition to formal evidentiary rulings, the judge must
decide, among many matters, whether to hold hearings of any kind, when to hold an evidentiary
hearing, when to permit or end questioning, when to seal documents from public view, when to
close courtroom proceedings to the public, when to allow the intervention or participation of
new parties, when to permit sketching or television cameras in the courtroom, whether to excuse
jurors or potential jurors, whether and when to hear from amici curiae, when to make on-site
inspections, when to admit a criminal defendant to bail, when to grant a criminal defendant the
opportunity to voluntarily surrender at a prison (rather than be remanded into custody immedi-
ately), whether to sever counts of an indictment, whether to accept the defendant's plea of
guilty, whether to have an observer or defendant removed for courtroom misconduct, and
whether to reveal the identity of a confidential informant.
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was not the broad discretion the judge exercised, but, rather, the fact
that the decision was virtually unreviewable on appeal.' 6 The lack of
appellate review meant that the unreasonable or inexplicable-or
even the bizarre-decision at this stage was beyond correction. In ad-
dition, no common standards or principles were articulated to guide
the exercise of judgment in sentencing.
B. The Significance of the Sentencing Ritual
We take as an established truth of our constitutional order that
the criminal justice system exists not only to protect society in a rea-
sonably efficient and humane way, but also to defend, affirm, and,
when necessary, clarify the moral principles embodied in our laws. In
the traditional ritual of sentencing, the judge pronounced not only a
sentence, but society's condemnation as well. The judge affirmed not
only society's need to punish, but also its right to do so. Central to
that venerable ritual was the presiding judge's exercise of informed
discretion. The judge's power to weigh all of the circumstances of the
particular case and all of the purposes of criminal punishment repre-
sented an important acknowledgment of the moral personhood of the
defendant and of the moral dimension of crime and punishment.
In the adjudicatory stages of a criminal case, the primary actors
are the prosecutor and the defense attorney. The prosecutor, in fash-
ioning an indictment and a trial strategy, decides what facts can be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the manner in which evidence will
be presented, and the inferences the jury may reasonably be called on
to make. In turn, the defendant and defense counsel decide which
charges to contest and how best to contest them. The judge's role at
this early, pretrial stage is, in a sense, secondary. If there is a plea of
guilty to one or more counts of the indictment, the judge's primary
concerns are to ascertain the voluntariness of the plea' 7 and, equally
significantly, to ensure that there is a factual basis for a guilty plea.18
In a criminal trial, the judge's role is in some ways even more
passive than at a plea hearing. At the trial stage, the judge is signifi-
cantly constrained by requirements of procedural regularity. There is
a clear demarcation of roles among the participants-judge, parties,
counsel, witnesses, and jurors. Throughout most of a trial, the judge's
role is largely reactive. The most significant judgments are usually
those concerning the admissibility of evidence-decisions made on the
basis of applicable rules and principles, the particular factual circum-
stances presented, and the judge's own legal experience. At the end
16 See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1974) (noting that sentences are
reviewable only for lawfulness under pertinent statutes).
17 See FED. R. GRIM. P. 11(c), (d); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 21.4(b) (2d ed. 1992).
18 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f).
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of the trial, the judge instructs the jury on the law, but these instruc-
tions are almost invariably drawn directly from relevant appellate
opinions and from standard ("pattern") jury instructions. At least in
the absence of television cameras, the judge at a criminal trial takes a
back seat to the attorneys and witnesses, and at the moment of conse-
quential decision, to the jury.
At a traditional sentencing hearing, however, the complex inter-
play of various actors, characteristic of the adjudicatory stage, re-
solved itself into a single axis of tension between the defendant, now
convicted, and the judge, robed and seated behind the high bench.
No longer serving primarily as an arbiter between the parties, the
judge was called upon to exercise the ultimate authority of the state.
Those present at a sentencing proceeding in a federal court (at
least in those courtrooms with which we are familiar) witnessed a rit-
ual of undeniable moral significance. It was critical that this proceed-
ing took the form of a face-to-face encounter between individuals.
The sentencing judge might have a wide audience: victims, their fami-
lies and friends, the family and friends of the defendant, the general
public, and even the appellate courts that might be called upon to re-
view the judge's presentencing decisions, though not, under the old
regime, the decision on the sentence itself.19 But the judge addressed
only one person when imposing a sentence and ordering the entry of
the judgment of conviction. The meaning of this solemn confronta-
tion was clear: only a person can pass moral judgment, and only a
person can be morally judged.
In emphasizing the human face of justice,20 we are not blind to
the limitations of the traditional sentencing hearing. Human judg-
ment is fallible. Unfortunately, this is a fact of our existence for which
there can be no easy technological solution. By replacing the case-by-
case exercise of human judgment with a mechanical calculus, we do
not judge better or more objectively, nor do we judge worse. Instead,
we cease to judge at all. We process individuals according to a variety
of purportedly objective criteria. But genuine judgment, in the sense
of moral reckoning, cannot be inscribed in a table of offense levels
and criminal history categories.
This does not mean that judgment, as we understand it, is a mat-
ter of subjective feeling. Judgment proceeds from principles. These
principles can and should be stated, rationally discussed, attacked, and
defended. The greatest deficiencies of the pre-Guidelines regime
19 Dorszynski, 418 U.S. at 431-32.
20 See United States v. Davern, 970 F.2d 1490, 1516 (6th Cir. 1992) (N. Jones, J., dissenting)
(describing sentencing as "an intensely human process"), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 923 (1993);
United States v. Naugle, 879 F. Supp. 262, 265 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (Weinstein, J.) (stressing "the
necessity for human interaction when sentence is imposed. It is then that the judicial system
relates most powerfully to the defendant as a person.").
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were its failure to provide for review of the decisions of sentencing
judges and its failure to ensure that the sentencing judge's exercise of
discretion was informed by authoritative criteria and principles. But it
is in the nature of moral and juridical principles that they must be
informed by a particular set of facts before they can be applied.21
Only a person can perform this task. Anthony Kronman has called
this irreducibly human capacity for judgment "practical wisdom" or
"prudence."22 It is a trait of character acquired by life experience. It
can never be reduced to a body of universal rules.
II. SENTENCING UNDER THE GUIDELINES
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines retained the traditional venue
of sentencing while effectively abandoning the substance of the tradi-
tional sentencing rite. In place of moral judgment, the Guidelines
have substituted bureaucratic penalization. The judge on the elevated
bench remains a visible symbol of society's moral authority, but the
substance and meaning of this ancient staging is gone in most cases.
A. The New Role of the Judge
With a far more limited role, the federal trial judge in today's
sentencing ritual has little or no opportunity to consider the overall
culpability of the defendant before him. The Guidelines themselves
determine not only which factors are relevant (and irrelevant) to crim-
inal punishment, but also, in most circumstances, the precise quantita-
tive relevance of each factor. In 1995, the last year for which
information is available, more than forty thousand defendants were
convicted and sentenced in the federal district courts of this country.23
In each of these forty thousand sentencings, the sentencing judge was
required to follow complex and abstract rules and to make minute
arithmetic calculations in order to arrive at a sentence. Each step of a
sentence calculation under the Guidelines represents what mathemati-
cians call a "minimal pair": The judge must decide whether a given
factor deemed relevant by the Sentencing Commission is present or
absent in the case at hand. Each decision step requires the judge to
21 Cf. Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Law A System of Rules?, reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 44-48 (Ronald M. Dworkin ed., 1977) (distinguishing between principles and rules in law).
22 ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 41 (1993).
23 Fewer than ten percent of these defendants were convicted after a trial; the majority en-
tered pleas of guilty, usually pursuant to plea agreements with federal prosecutors. ADMIN. OF-
FICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 1995 REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR 225 (reporting that 46,773 defendants, including corporations and other enti-
ties, were convicted and sentenced in 1995; 91% were convicted by plea of guilty). See also U.S
SENTENCING COMM'N, 1995 ANN. REP. 56 tbl.17 (recording a total of 38,325 cases-apparently
including multi-defendant cases-ending in conviction in 1995; all but 8.1% involved pleas of
guilty).
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add or subtract points or "levels"-generally no more than two at a
time-that will ultimately determine the sentence of the defendant.
This sequence of minimal-pair decisions offers little opportunity
for judicial reasoning. The judge's role is largely limited to factual
determinations and rudimentary arithmetic operations. Moreover,
the Sentencing Commission has taken pains to limit sharply the
judge's authority to depart from the sentencing range that these arith-
metic calculations yield. As we discuss further in Part IV, the Guide-
lines are comprehensive, encompassing many different contexts and
circumstances in which federal crimes may be committed, and absent
approval from the prosecutor, the sentencing judge may depart from
the Guidelines only in an atypical case.24 One judge has recently lik-
ened his role in sentencing to that of a "notary public";25 another has
likened the sentencing judge's role under the new dispensation to that
of "an accountant." 26
The hallmark of judging in the common-law tradition is the
judge's application of general principles to specific facts, a process by
which the general principles are themselves refined, explained, and,
indeed, reconsidered. 27 In sentencing, the Guidelines have minimized
the opportunities and removed the authority for judges to do what
they do best-to reason and to apply general principles of law to par-
24 Under the rules issued by the Sentencing Commission, judges have discretion to depart
from the Guideline range in only three situations. The first is when the prosecution makes a
motion for downward departure on the basis of the defendant's substantial assistance to authori-
ties. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (1995) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. In 1995,
these substantial assistance departures occurred in approximately one-fifth of all cases sentenced,
accounting for nearly two-thirds of all departures (upward or downward). See U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N 1995 ANN. REP. 89-91 tbl.31.
The second situation is when the Guidelines expressly empower (and even encourage) de-
parture if certain facts are found. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 (permitting a judge to depart if
criminal history score calculated under the Guidelines either overstates or understates "the seri-
ousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct").
The third situation in which a judge may depart is when there are demonstrable aspects of
the defendant's criminal behavior or of the defendant's personal history that (a) warrant a differ-
ent sentence, (b) are not proscribed from consideration by the Guidelines, and (c) are factors
that the Commission did "not adequately take [ ] into account in formulating" the Guidelines. 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994). The Commission has referred to such cases as falling outside the
"heartland." See U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.0; 1A4(b). We discuss this form of departure in Part IV, infra.
25 Frank S. Gilbert, The Probation Officer's Perception of the Allocation of Discretion, 4 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 109, 109 (1991) (quoting an unnamed but "well-known and highly respected
jurist"; the author is Chief U.S. Probation Officer, District of Oregon).
26 Ellsworth A. Van Graafeiland, Some Thoughts on the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 31
VILL. L. REV. 1291, 1293-94 (1986).
27 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 18-19 (1921) ("[T]he
judge must look to the common law for the rule that fits the case."); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
JR., THE COMMON LAW 36 (1881) ("And as the law is administered by able and experienced
men, who know too much to sacrifice good sense to a syllogism, it will be found that, when
ancient rules maintain themselves in the way that has been and will be shown in this book, new
reasons more fitted to the time have been found for them .... ).
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ticular circumstances. Instead, the Guidelines require judges to ad-
dress many quantitative and definitional issues in excruciating detail,
while staying away from larger questions relating to culpability and
the purposes of criminal punishment. Every hour a judge spends ana-
lyzing the Guidelines is an hour that might instead be directed toward
application, and thus further refinement and development, of com-
mon principles and standards of criminal sentencing.28 In the course
of drafting the Guidelines, the Commission itself may have applied
known general principles to exemplary situations, and undertaken
thoughtful legal analysis of these situations-but its directives for
computing severity levels and criminal history scores under the Guide-
lines rarely, if ever, reveal this reasoning. 29 The Guidelines have re-
placed the traditional judicial role of deliberation and moral
judgment, which is inherently imperfect with complex quantitative cal-
culations that convey the impression of scientific precision and objec-
tivity. The judge engages not in moral reasoning but in minute
parsing of administrative regulations.
B. The New Role of the Probation Officer
At the same time that the Guidelines have greatly reduced the
authority and role of the judge, they have enhanced the roles of two
other actors in the ritual: the prosecutor and the probation officer.
Many critics of the Guidelines have insisted that the new system has,
at bottom, simply transferred sentencing authority from the judge to
the prosecutor. 30 Wary of this possibility, both the Sentencing Com-
mission and the Department of Justice have sought to limit
prosecutorial power to plea bargain around the Guidelines,31 thereby
ensuring the hegemony of the Commission itself. Even so, there is
28 See Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Second Impression of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 363-64 (1992) (noting that judges in Eastern District of New York
spend less time discussing substantive issues of punishment).
29 In the larger project from which this article is adapted, we examine the public record of
the Commission's creation of the Sentencing Guidelines. Suffice it to say here that the Commis-
sion has never sought to explain or justify the particular factors it chose as relevant (and not
relevant) to sentence severity. See MICHAEL H. TONRY, SENTENCING MATrERS 83-89 (1996).
30 See, e.g., Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines: Unacceptable
Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1721-24 (1992); William J. Powell &
Michael T. Cimino, Prosecutorial Discretion Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Is the Fox
Guarding the Hen House?, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 373, 382-95 (1995).
31 See Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of
Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
501, 508-12 (1992) (describing "Thornburgh" memorandum); William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R.
Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV.
495, 499-500 & n. 27 (1990) (asserting that the Guidelines' "relevant conduct" principle, in par-
ticular, limits prosecutorial control); Memorandum from Attorney General Janet Reno (Oct. 12,
1993), reprinted in 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 352 (1994).
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little doubt that the Guidelines have augmented the authority of the
prosecutor relative to that of the judge.32
What is clear beyond doubt is that the role of the probation of-
ficer has been transformed. Rather than providing guidance to the
court in its exercise of sentencing discretion, probation officers now
undertake a kind of preliminary adjudication of all issues made rele-
vant by the Sentencing Guidelines. No longer serving merely as a
conduit for the parties to present their respective versions of the of-
fense to the judge, the presentence report today gives a single ver-
sion-one determined, in principle, by the probation officer herself.
The officer then provides her Guidelines calculus-applying the
Guidelines to the facts as she finds them and computing a recom-
mended sentencing range. Together, these two functions-independ-
ent fact-finding and autonomous Guidelines calculation-make the
probation officer the "'special master' of guidelines facts" 33 and the
primary enforcer of the Guidelines.
The enhanced investigatory function of the federal probation of-
ficer is reflected in the rules governing presentence reports. When the
Guidelines went into effect, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
were amended to require preparation of a presentence report in
nearly all cases; the defendant no longer had the right to waive its
preparation. As recently further amended, the Federal Rules require
that the presentence report advise the court as to "the classification of
the offense and of the defendant under the categories established by
the Sentencing Commission... that the probation officer believes to
be applicable to the case." 34 Probation authorities at the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts in Washington have provided
even more specific directives to officers in the field: they may not
"withhold from the court reliable information" even if the prosecutor
and defense attorney attempt "by agreement" to "eliminate relevant
32 Although prosecutorial power has been increased in relation to judicial power, it is impor-
tant to realize that the Guidelines regime has diminished prosecutorial prerogatives in some
respects. When prosecutors in the previous era indicted a defendant for a particular offense,
they knew that after conviction they might hope to influence the sentencing judge to impose a
severe or a mild sentence; now prosecutors know that if conviction is obtained, they have limited
authority to attempt to influence the sentence, and that such authority is at its maximum only in
the event the defendant provides substantial assistance in the prosecution of others. If the pros-
ecutors faithfully abide by the admonitions of the Sentencing Commission and the Department
of Justice regarding plea bargaining and factual allegations at sentencing, their ability to influ-
ence the final sentencing range is significantly constrained by the same rules that constrain the
judge. We discuss the matter of prosecutorial discretion in the Guidelines era in STrrm &
CABRANES, supra note *.
33 Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons in
Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 679, 732.
34 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)(B).
1257
91:1247 (1997)
HeinOnline -- 91 Nw. U. L. Rev.  1257 1996-1997
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
information. '35 The most recent instructions from Washington like-
wise refer to the "probation officer's role as the court's independent
investigator. 36
It bears recalling that federal probation officers are generally not
trained for criminal investigation. One officer has delicately explained
that many of the skills required for investigation-including the evalu-
ation of the reliability of information and the credibility of wit-
nesses-"were previously not considered within their province. ' 37 In
fact, most federal probation officers have been trained in social
work. 38 It is therefore ironic, as Sharon Bunzel has observed, that in
the new sentencing regime, probation officers need not devote signifi-
cant attention to who the offender is (and how he came to be that
way).39 The Guidelines render largely irrelevant much of the back-
ground information about a defendant as a person,40 unless the infor-
mation is so extraordinary that it arguably makes the case "atypical"
of the criminal offenses addressed by the Guidelines. 41 And even in
the extraordinary case, personal background information about the
defendant is never required for the sentencing decision,42 because de-
parture from the Guidelines is itself never required.
The second, and arguably more significant, function of the proba-
tion officer is to apply the law as stated by the Sentencing Commission
to the facts that the probation officer finds and reports. Probation
officers are now the Guidelines "experts" in the courtroom-trained
in Sentencing Commission workshops and remotely guided by its
35 PROBATION Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, PUB. No. 107, PRESENTENCE IN-
VESTIGATION REPORTS UNDER THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984, at 4-5 (1987).
36 Id. at 3 (emphasis added); see also Catharine M. Goodwin, The Independent Role of the
Probation Officer at Sentencing and in Applying Koon v. United States, 60 FED. PROBATION
Sept. 1996, at 71.
37 Michael Piotrowski, The Enhanced Role of the Probation Officer in the Sentencing Process,
4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 96, 97 (1991) (author is Supervising Probation Officer for the District
of Massachusetts); see also Felicia Sarner, "Fact Bargaining" Under the Sentencing Guidelines:
The Role of the Probation Department, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 328, 329 (1996) (author, an
assistant federal public defender, argues against "proactive" fact investigations by probation of-
ficers, who "are not trained law enforcement agents").
38 See Piotrowski, supra note 37, at 96.
39 Bunzel, supra note 7, at 965-66; see also Francesca D. Bowman, The Greening of Probation
Officers in Their New Role, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 99 (1991) (the author is Deputy Chief
Probation Officer for the District of Massachusetts); Julian Abele Cook, Jr., The Changing Role
of the Probation Officer in the Federal Court, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 112 (1991) (the author is
Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan).
40 U.S.S.G §§ 5H1.1-5H1.6; 5H1.9-5H1.12.
41 See infra text accompanying notes 133-42.
42 As recognized in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, information in the presentence
report about the defendant's personal history may be of importance to correctional officials. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(4)(A) (requiring presentence report to include "information about...
any circumstances that, because they affect the defendant's behavior, may be helpful in imposing
sentence or in correctional treatment") (emphasis added).
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manuals, worksheets, and telephone "hotline. ' 43 The probation of-
ficer's familiarity with the evolving law of Guidelines application is
critical because the Guidelines findings and calculations in the of-
ficer's presentence report are the inevitable focus of the sentencing
hearing under the new sentencing regime.
Guidelines application, however, is, in the nature of things, a spe-
cies of legal reasoning. Several years ago, the Federal Courts Study
Committee, created by an act of Congress to study the future of the
federal courts, expressed skepticism as to whether probation officers
were appropriate personnel for this task, noting that "[a]lthough dis-
trict judges have great confidence in the federal probation service,
there is a growing concern among judges, prosecutors and defense
lawyers that the new sentencing regime imposes on these officers re-
sponsibilities... for which they may not be particularly well trained or
well suited."44 The degree of legal knowledge required to perform
this function is indicated by the fact that several years ago, all federal
probation officers were provided training in Westlaw and Lexis, the
online computer services for legal research,45 in order to be able to
keep abreast of appellate jurisprudence on the Sentencing Guidelines.
But it is not clear that mere access to such information can take the
place of legal training; one probation officer has noted that "[t]o be
really good.., at [the] task of presentence writing, the probation of-
ficer will need to employ a new kind of reasoning-syllogistic-here-
tofore foreign to probation work. '46
The independent adjudicatory duties of the probation officer
have altered considerably her relationship with the other participants
in the sentencing hearing.47 Defense attorneys have explained that
43 The Commission has two sets of worksheets: one set for calculating sentences for individu-
als, and a second set for calculating sentences for corporations and other organizations. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, A GUIDE TO PUBLICATIONS & RESOURCES 31 (1996). As of 1995, the
Commission had two telephone "hotlines," one for judges and probation officers and another for
prosecutors and defense attorneys. Both were open between 8:30 a.m. and 5:30 p.m. See id. at 1.
The Commission has also made a "variety of exercises, visual aids, and other training materials
designed by the Commission's training staff.., available to the public." Id. at 2. There are many
other compendiums of Guidelines jurisprudence. See infra note 96.
44 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE
138 (1990).
45 Charlie E. Varnon, The Role of the Probation Officer in the Guidelines System, 4 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 63, 64 (1991) (the author is Chief U.S. Probation Officer for the Eastern Dis-
trict of California).
46 Harry Joe Jaffe, The Presentence Report, Probation Officer Accountability, and Recruit-
ment Practices: Some Influences of Guideline Sentencing, 53 FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1989, at 12,
12; see also Varnon, supra note 45, at 64 (noting "the perception that officers are now making
findings of fact and [conclusions of] law which we are not trained or competent to make").
47 See generally Robert H. Edmunds, Jr., Analyzing the Tension Between Prosecutors and
Probation Officers Over "Fact Bargaining", 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 318, 319 (1996) (noting
tension between probation officers and prosecutors).
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they are reluctant to speak openly with the probation officer about the
defendant, for fear that any revelation might trigger an upward adjust-
ment under the Guidelines.48 Indeed, "some defense counsel have
come to regard the probation officer as a second prosecutor, whose
purpose is to review and then raise the guideline calculations of the
government. ' 49 Although many probation officers rely primarily on
the prosecutor in drafting the presentence report's version of the of-
fense,50 prosecutors have an incentive not to be forthcoming with the
probation officer when the defendant's agreement to plead guilty has
been tendered with the expectation that certain allegations or certain
facts will not be considered in the calculation of the sentence.51
The probation officer may stand in a quasi-adversarial position
even in relation to the judge-or, at the very least, the officer stands,
as never before, at arm's length from the judge. To be sure, as a formal
matter of law, federal probation officers remain part of the judicial
branch of the federal government, and they continue to be appointed
by the judges of the district courts.52 And because of the presumed
expertise of the probation officer and the tedious and often mechani-
cal work of computation under the Guidelines, many trial judges are
disposed to defer to the officer's judgments over the objection of one
48 See Jerry D. Denzlinger & David E. Miller, The Federal Probation Officer: Life Before and
After Guideline Sentencing, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1991, at 49, 50-51 (describing how probation
officer is seen as a "third adversary" in the courtroom); Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of
Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. Rav. 161, 200 (1991) (recounting
public defender's description of probation officers as more adversarial than prosecutors in
Guidelines regime); Piotrowski, supra note 37, at 98 (noting that when defendants are inter-
viewed by probation officers, their attorneys frequently direct them not to answer questions). As
a result, it is now the common (and perfectly understandable) practice of defense counsel to
instruct their clients, as well as their clients' relatives and friends, to decline to cooperate with
probation officers prior to sentencing, or to do so only if defense counsel is present.
49 Piotrowski, supra note 37, at 97; see also Sarner, supra note 37, at 329 (alleging that "pro-
bation officers' version [of offense] too often attributes greater culpability to the defendant").
50 Francesca Bowman, Probation Officers Advisory Group Survey, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP.
303, 305 (1996).
51 See Marcia Chambers, Probation Officers Sit in Judgment, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 16, 1990, at 13,
13-14; Gleeson, supra note 12, at 315; see also Frank 0. Bowman, III, To Tell the Truth: The
Problem of Prosecutorial "Manipulation" of Sentencing Facts, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 324, 325-
26 (1996) (discussing common prosecutorial practice of not advising probation officer of facts
concerning offenses not readily provable beyond a reasonable doubt).
When probation officers suspect they have been "frozen out" by both defense counsel and
prosecutors, they may seek out the federal agents (in the FBI or the Secret Service, for instance)
who investigated the criminal case, going behind the backs of the parties in the case in order to
ferret out the "actual facts." The investigating agent knows and is "most willing to share" infor-
mation regarding the full extent of the defendant's participation in an offense. Piotrowski, supra
note 37, at 97; see also Bunzel, supra note 7, at 960, 963. Indeed, it has been reported that
probation officers may assist law enforcement agents in continuing to investigate the defendant
in the interval between conviction and sentence. Piotrowski, supra note 37, at 97. We hasten to
add, however, that there is no reason to believe that this practice is widespread.
52 18 U.S.C. § 3602(a) (1994).
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of the parties.5 3 One judge has explained: "We find ourselves giving
probation reports cursory attention because we are usually just check-
ing the probation officer's addition. '54
On the other hand, probation officers who vigorously play the
role of "guardian of the Guidelines" 55 may appear to judges to be
indistinguishable from a third party in the case. They may appear to
be precisely what the Sentencing Commission expects them to be-de
facto, though not yet de jure, agents of the Commission, charged with
the diligent implementation of a system that is designed to limit the
authority of the judge.5 6 That the Probation Office is formally a part
of the judiciary is of little solace to the judges; after all, the Sentencing
Commission and its bureaucracy are also located, by statutory pre-
scription, "in the judicial branch" of the federal government.5 7 If a
party disputes a factual finding made in the presentence report, the
judge may eliminate altogether the customary confidential meeting
with the probation officer prior to a sentencing. Especially in cases in
which there is a likelihood that the probation officer will be required
to testify under oath at the projected hearing (requiring the judge, in
turn, to resolve disputed issues of fact in part on the basis of the credi-
bility of the probation officer), the judge may feel bound to "decline
to meet and talk with the probation officer about the presentence re-
port in an effort to avoid any claims of ex parte communications." 58 In
53 See Cook, supra note 39, at 113; Heaney, supra note 48, at 168-69; Nagel & Schulhofer,
supra note 31, at 538.
54 Weinstein, supra note 28, at 364; see also United States v. O'Meara, 895 F.2d 1216, 1223
(8th Cir.) (Bright, J., dissenting in part), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 943 (1990).
55 The origin of this characterization is obscure, but it has been widely adopted by many
commentators, including defense attorneys, see Judy Clarke, Ruminations on Restrepo, 2 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 135 (1989), and probation officers themselves, see Gilbert, supra note 25, at
110.
56 See Magdeline E. Jensen, Has the Role of the U.S. Probation Officer Really Changed?, 4
FED. SENTENCING REP. 94, 95 (1991) (responding to judges and others who complain about
probation officers in the Guidelines era, asserting that probation officers are simply doing their
job and that "[i]t is of no use to kill the messenger" when what is really at issue is the
"message"-that is, the Sentencing Guidelines).
57 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1994). For the legislative history of this provision, see Stith & Koh,
supra note 1, at 280 & n.363. As explained there, this characterization of the Sentencing Com-
mission as an "independent commission in the judicial branch" remained unchanged as the bill
that became the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was considered and modified in four different
Congresses between 1977 and 1984. The terms for appointment of the Commission were altered
significantly during this time. Compare S. 1437, 95th Cong. (as introduced May 2, 1977) (provid-
ing for appointment of nine-member sentencing commission designated by U.S. Judicial Confer-
ence) with 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1994) (Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 providing for seven-
member commission, with all members appointed by President and confirmed by Senate, three
Commissioners to be federal judges chosen by the President "after considering" a list of six
names submitted by the Judicial Conference, with all Commissioners removable for "cause").
58 Cook, supra note 39, at 113. The new role of the probation officer in a system where the
judge's discretionary authority has been so diminished may actually have the effect of reducing
the probation officer's real influence over the sentencing outcome. In the pre-Guidelines era,
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addition, many judges at plea hearings will routinely give defendants a
Miranda-style explanation of the role of the probation officer, includ-
ing an admonition that anything they say to a probation officer can be
used against them at sentencing.
It is not surprising, in these circumstances, that federal judges in-
creasingly reject the probation officer's Guidelines calculations in
favor of a sentence or sentencing range that the parties jointly recom-
mend as part of a plea bargain.59 To be sure, a judge who is disposed
to follow a plea agreement that the parties have reached may be put in
an awkward position when a probation officer formally reports that
the agreement is grounded on allegedly inaccurate or incomplete
statements of offense conduct that distort Guidelines calculations. In
response, some judges have directed probation officers to limit their
investigations to the facts as stipulated by the parties,60 while others
have viewed a sentencing agreement between the parties as a legiti-
mate alternative to the sentencing outcome that would likely be calcu-
lated under the Guidelines in the absence of the agreement. 61 Even
though the judge is never legally bound to sentence in accordance
with a plea agreement, 62 there may be good reasons for doing so in
the Guidelines regime. Elsewhere, we examine in some detail the
matter of sentence bargaining under the Guidelines,63 which has been
called the "dirty little secret" of the Guidelines era.64 For now, we
merely note the important fact that in a large number of federal court-
rooms in the Guidelines era, it may not matter very much that a judge
the officer could through his insights and perspectives about the defendant significantly influence
the judge's exercise of discretion. In the present era, the probation officer too often is reduced
to seemingly rote application of sentencing rules.
59 See Bowman, supra note 50, at 306 (chief probation officers report in survey that, in most
cases, sentencing judge defers to plea agreement).
60 See Goodwin, supra note 36, at 71.
61 See United States v. Aguilar, 884 F. Supp. 88, 90-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (Weinstein, J.); cf.
Gleeson, supra note 12, at 317 (urging that Guidelines should be amended to clarify legitimacy
of "sentence bargains").
62 The plea agreement may be in the form of a "recommendation" or may be "binding" on
the judge. Compare FED. R. GRIM. P. 11(e)(1)(B) (recommendation of sentence) with FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11(e)(1)(C) (specification of sentence). However, even the plea agreements that pur-
port to "bind" the judge will be binding only with judge's permission. See supra note 12. If at
the time of sentencing and after reviewing the presentence report, the judge rejects a "binding"
plea bargain, the defendant is permitted to withdraw the plea. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(3),
(4).
63 See STITH & CABRANES, supra note *.
64 Tony Garoppolo, Fact Bargaining: What the Sentencing Commission Has Wrought, 10
Crim. Prac. Man. (BNA) 405, 405 (Oct. 9, 1996) (asserting that the "widespread use of fact
bargaining, and the lying to the court that is inevitable with the frequent use of such bargaining,
is the dirty little secret in the prosecution of federal criminal cases"); see also Alexander Bunin,
Whose Facts? Counterpoint to Probation Officer's View on Fact Bargaining, 10 Crim. Prac. Man.
(BNA) 477, 477 (Nov. 6, 1996) (taking issue with Garoppolo on grounds that (1) fact bargaining
does not occur in all districts, and (2) probation officers may not have the "true facts").
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is formally pronouncing the sentence. The sentencing range is largely
determined either by the probation officer applying the Sentencing
Guidelines, or by the parties themselves through a plea agreement
that includes stipulations that will yield predictable results under the
Guidelines.
C. The New Ritual
The sentencing proceeding itself has been recast from a discre-
tionary into a formal adjudicatory process, in which the court makes
findings of fact that translate into sentencing requirements under the
Guidelines. By largely eliminating from the sentencing proceeding
the power of any individual to consider the circumstances of the crime
and of the defendant in their entirety and to form a judgment on that
basis, the Guidelines threaten to transform the venerable ritual of sen-
tencing into a puppet theater in which defendants are not persons, but
kinds of persons, abstract entities to be defined by a chart, their con-
crete existence systematically ignored and thus nullified. The judge
who conducts the sentencing is now, by design, little more than the
instrument of a distant bureaucracy. Like the law in Kafka's para-
ble,65 the real power of the court has receded into an impenetrable
state agency, nearly inaccessible to the courtroom observer. The de-
fendant may implore the court to consider the full circumstances of his
crime and his humanity, but the judge generally is not permitted to
consider most of these circumstances in sentencing. Indeed, the range
of attitudes and gestures we commonly associate with sentencing-
defiance or contrition on the part of the defendant; vengeance or for-
giveness on the part of his victims, condemnation; admonition, or for-
bearance on the part of the judge-become strangely inappropriate,
even cruelly farcical in this setting.
Without moral authority, neither mercy nor moral condemnation
are possible. Under the Guidelines, mercy, by which the full applica-
tion of the law is relaxed in furtherance of the law's ends, has been
rendered largely obsolete. Without the possibility of mercy, however,
rigid adherence to the law cannot express severity of judgment. No
moral judgment can be expressed at all.
The result is that the sentencing hearing often takes on the spirit
of the Guidelines themselves: the hearing has become dry, compli-
cated, mechanistic, and frequently incomprehensible to courtroom ob-
servers, including the parties. The discussion centers on "base levels,"
"points," "scores," "categories," and other Guidelines jargon. A re-
cent article in The Washington Post captured the terms of discourse at
a sentencing hearing under the Guidelines:
65 Franz Kafka, Before the Law, in THE COMPLETE STORIES AND PARABLES OF KAFKA 3
(Nahum N. Glatzer ed. & Willa & Edwin Muir trans., 1971).
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"The court finds that the base offense level is 20," the judge began.
"Pursuant to Guidelines 2K2.1(b)(4), the offense level is increased by
two levels [to 22] .... The Court notes that the criminal convictions ...
result in a total criminal history category score of 18. At the time of the
instan[t] offense.., the defendant was serving a parole sentenc[e] in two
causes of action. And pursuant to Sentencing Guidelines 4A1.1(D), 2
points are therefore added. The total criminal history points is 20. And
according to the Sentencing Guidelines Chapter 5, Part A, 20 criminal
history points establish a criminal history category of 6... [As a result]
the guideline range for imprisonment is 84 to 105 months. '66
Nothing so dramatically illustrates the transformation of the sen-
tencing hearing under this new regime than those cases in which, after
thirty or forty minutes of discussion in this double-speak, the sentenc-
ing judge realizes that parties and spectators in the courtroom are
staring ahead in dazed numbness, having lost all sense of what is hap-
pening. That is when the judge feels bound to pause, to try to reassure
courtroom observers, in comprehensible language, that the principal
interlocutors in the courtroom do indeed understand what they are
talking about, and that what is going on, though perhaps unintelligible
to them, is indeed honest and fair. This is sometimes an awkward and
embarrassing moment for the judge, who must try to explain a pro-
ceeding that may appear as arbitrary to the judge as it does to the
observer in the courtroom.
The observer who comes to the contemporary federal courtroom
to witness the passing of judgment on a member of the community-
to observe the drama of catharsis, appeals for mercy, appeals for se-
verity, and the reasoned judgment that takes all of this into account-
is sorely disappointed. That observer finds in today's federal court-
room precious little discussion of the human qualities of the victim or
the defendant, of the inherently unquantifiable moral aspects of the
defendant's crime, or of the type of sanction that would best achieve
any of the purposes of sentencing.67 The "purpose" of sentencing in
the new regime, it will be learnt, is nothing more and nothing less than
compliance with the Sentencing Guidelines.
This state of affairs reflects fundamental features of the Guide-
lines and suggests that they have succeeded in doing what many of
their proponents wanted them to do. The sentencing reform move-
ment of the 1970s sought to take the judge, as such, out of the sentenc-
66 Mary Pat Flaherty & Joan Biskupic, Despite Overhaul, Federal Sentencing Still Misfires,
WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 6, 1996, at Al (first of five articles in series entitled "Justice By the
Numbers").
67 The only time that a visitor is likely to see the judge exercise the sort of discretion that one
associates with traditional sentencing is in the very last stage of the sentencing hearing, when the
judge is called upon to set the precise point within the (twenty-five percent) sentencing range
permitted under the Guidelines; only at this stage may a witness observe the judge exercise the
discretionary authority that historically characterized criminal sentencing.
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ing process as much as possible and to replace discretionary, case-by-
case judgment with the "objective" determinations of experts.68 The
federal Sentencing Guidelines as they are now constructed seek not to
augment but to replace the knowledge and experience of judges. This
quixotic attempt to eliminate "inter-judge disparity" by curtailing ju-
dicial discretion has meant the virtual elimination of moral judgment
from the sentencing process. This most disturbing failure of Guide-
lines sentencing is thus the inevitable consequence of the dogged pur-
suit of a single objective. Reduction of inter-judge disparity is
certainly a worthwhile goal for sentencing reform. But it is a complex
goal, and myopic focus on this objective has created a system that too
often ignores other important values of criminal sentencing and
punishment.
Many judges are not at ease operating within such a system, and
some may be sorely tempted to manipulate their Guidelines calcula-
tions to avoid the results called for by the Guidelines. When the
Guidelines' mandated sentencing range seems inadequate or too
harsh, the judge may be tempted to reconsider factual "findings" in
order to alter the Guidelines calculation, or tempted to devise a basis
for departure that may be largely irrelevant to culpability in the case
at hand, but at least may pass muster in the Court of Appeals as a
permissible basis for imposing a sentence different from the one pre-
scribed by the Guidelines' sentencing calculus. One judge has re-
cently described how his fact-finding and Guidelines application at
sentencing hearings varies with the extent to which the prosecutor
seems disposed to appeal the sentence, explaining that "the best de-
partures" are "the ones that aren't appealed. '69 Another judge re-
sponded to a survey about the Guidelines by noting with disgust:
"[T]he Guidelines... have made charlatans and dissemblers of us all.
We spend our time plotting and scheming, bending and twisting, dis-
torting and ignoring the law in an effort to achieve a just result. All
under the banner of 'truth in sentencing'! "70 Many other judges are
loathe to attempt maneuvers around the Guidelines, viewing such ma-
nipulation as a lawless exercise of unsanctioned power. In any event,
the prospect of appellate review constrains the ability even of willing
judges to use the pretense of fact-finding to exercise sentence discre-
tion sub silentio.
68 See Marvin E. Frankel, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 113-14 (1972); Stith
& Koh, supra note 1, at 228-29.
69 1995 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 1518 (quoting Wayne R. Anderson, United States District
Judge for the Northern District of Illinois); see also Gleeson, supra note 12, at 315 (a district
judge, formerly a federal prosecutor, arguing that judges should welcome bargains that agree to
a compromise Guidelines range because it "conserves judicial resources at both the district and
appellate levels").
70 Weinstein, supra note 28, at 365 (quoting unnamed judge in the Eastern District of New
York) (ellipsis and emphasis in original).
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III. THE NEW JURISPRUDENCE
A. Guidelines Fact-Finding: Complex, Obscure, and Prolonged
The judicial fact-finding required by the Guidelines is both tedi-
ous and difficult. Little may hinge on the issue in dispute because the
existence of a particular aggravating or mitigating circumstance may
ultimately have little effect on the length of a sentence. Yet many
minor factual distinctions are often exceedingly difficult to resolve be-
cause they are complicated or ambiguous. Finally, the sheer number
of factual issues made relevant by the Guidelines is extraordinary.
There are literally hundreds upon hundreds of definitional terms and
factual specifications that sentencing courts may be forced to apply,
and about which appellate courts must generate innumerable, dense
opinions. The primary significance of the elaborate jurisprudence
spawned by the Sentencing Guidelines is that it aids in implementing
this particular set of rules-in much the same way that rulings of ad-
ministrative law judges in the Social Security Administration imple-
ment their particular legal regime, or that rulings of Internal Revenue
Service officials implement the federal tax regime.
In many other areas of the law that have become exceedingly
technical or that require a particular expertise, Congress has created
specialized tribunals. These include courts or administrative agency
tribunals on the trial or appellate level dealing with social security en-
titlements, federal taxes, patents and copyrights, and bankruptcies.
Criminal sentencing has not been removed (yet) from the federal
courts of general jurisdiction. Although a bureaucracy in Washington
writes the rules, their application is left to the federal courts.71 And
there are many such opinions; two-thirds of all criminal appeals in the
federal system involve Guidelines issues.72
As an illustration of the nature of judging under the Guidelines,
consider the distinction between "minor" and "minimal" participation
in a crime. The Guidelines provide that the defendant's numerical
offense level should be reduced by two points if the defendant was
only a "minor" participant in the offense, but by four points if the
defendant was a "minimal" participant.73 Unless the prosecution and
defense have agreed in advance to accept the probation officer's char-
71 It is generally recognized that the judges of the federal district courts and the courts of
appeals are "generalists." See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra
note 44, at 121.
72 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS: 1995 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 53 (recording 10,162 criminal appeals filed in fiscal
year 1995, 8731 involving defendants sentenced under the Guidelines; four-fifths of those cases
involved claims under the Guidelines); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 1995 ANN. REP. 136
& n.1 (recording total of only 6863 cases involving appeals by defendants sentenced under the
Guidelines; 65% of these involved claims about the Guidelines).
73 U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 (1995).
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acterization, one party is likely to object to the characterization in the
presentence report. Even when the parties have agreed, the judge
may be doubtful about the proposed characterization. In these cases
the judge must make a decision on this arcane issue, although, in prac-
tice, many judges will simply adopt the probation officer's finding.
Once the trial judge renders a decision, the distinction between "mi-
nor" and "minimal" participation becomes the business of the federal
courts of appeals. There exist literally hundreds of appellate opinions
on permutations of this distinction 74-a distinction that is relevant
only for applying the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. There are appel-
late opinions, for instance, on whether a sole participant in a crime
may qualify for one or the other of these reductions;75 whether either
reduction applies when the other participants were undercover
agents;76 whether the adjustment is to be applied on the basis of the
defendant's role in the offense of conviction only, or on the basis of all
the activities that constitute relevant conduct;77 when drug couriers
qualify for one or the other adjustment;78 whether drug "steerers" or
middlemen qualify for one or the other adjustment;79 and whether the
defendant qualifies simply because of doing less than the other partici-
pants, even if the defendant did as much as most offenders usually
do.80
The set of appellate opinions on the distinctions between "minor"
and "minimal" participants is only one of many possible examples of
the extraordinary effort that is required to implement the Sentencing
Commission's detailed mandates. Other issues that have become the
subject of detailed discussion and analysis in the sentencing courtroom
and in trial and appellate case law include:
74 A Westlaw search on Sept. 15, 1996, found 869 cases reported on this distinction alone.
75 See, e.g., United States v. Costales, 5 F.3d 480, 484-88 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Caballero, 936 F.2d 1291, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
76 Compare United States v. Speenburgh, 990 F.2d 72, 74-76 (2d Cir. 1993) (no, but depar-
ture by analogy may be made) with Costales, 5 F.3d at 486 (no, and departure also is not
available).
77 Compare United States v. Valdez-Gonzalez, 957 F.2d 643, 648-50 (9th Cir. 1992) (permit-
ting adjustment to be applied on basis of role in offense of conviction only) with United States v.
Webster, 996 F.2d 209, 210-11 (9th Cir. 1993) (overruling Valdez-Gonzalez because new amend-
ment to Sentencing Guidelines stated that adjustment for role in offense is based on relevant
conduct).
78 See United States v. Lopez-Gil, 965 F.2d 1124, 1131 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Rossy,
953 F.2d 321, 326 (7th Cir. 1992).
79 See United States v. Mustread, 42 F.3d 1097, 1103-05 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v.
LaValley, 999 F.2d 663, 666 (2d Cir. 1993).
80 See United States v. Lopez, 937 F.2d 716,728 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that defendant's role
should be compared to that of the "average participant" in such a crime); United States v.
Thomas, 932 F.2d 1085, 1092 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that it is not enough that defendant partici-
pated "less" than other defendants).
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-Which annual edition of the Guidelines Manual is to be applied at a
sentencing, the manual in effect on the date of sentencing or the manual
in effect when the crime was committed? Which of these editions should
be used when crimes were committed over a span of several years? 81
-What is the difference between "leadership" and "managerial" roles
in a crime (which require different upward adjustments)?82
-How should a sentencing court calculate the weight of drugs when
they are mixed with other ingredients or superimposed on other
materials? 83
-How should a court calculate the weight of marijuana when it is seized
as dry leaf, as opposed to seizure as a living plant (roots and all)?8 4
-How should a court estimate drug quantity when no drugs are seized
but the defendant has been convicted of conspiracy to deal in drugs?85
-For each of the nineteen crime categories listed in the Guidelines, how
much planning constitutes "more than minimal planning"? When is such
planning by others attributable also to the defendant?8 6
-Where the offense level is increased for "more than minimal plan-
ning," is it also appropriate to apply the upward adjustments for having
had a "leadership" or "managerial" role in the offense? What about the
upward adjustments for "use of a special skill," or for "concealment"?8 7
-How many acts constitute "repeated acts" (a question that arises in
various factual settings)?88
-In order to apply the upward adjustment for an "unusually vulnerable
victim," is the court required to find that the defendant intentionally se-
lected his victim on this basis, or simply that the defendant actually knew
of the vulnerability, or should have known of the vulnerability?8 9
-In making upward or downward adjustments for "role in the offense,"
should the court consider the role of the defendant in relation to the role
of other actual participants in the offense at hand, or in relation to the
role of a hypothetical average participant in such a crime? 90
-Should the upward adjustment for "abuse of trust" apply only when
the defendant had a relationship of trust with victims, or also when the
81 See THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., GUIDELINE SENTENCING: AN OUTLINE OF APPELLATE
CASE LAW ON SELECTED ISSUES 12, 18 (1995) [hereinafter "GUIDELINE SENTENCING OUTLINE"];
see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11 (1995) (stating, inter alia, that "[i]f the defendant is convicted of two
offenses, the first committed before, and the second after, a revised edition of the Guidelines
Manual became effective, the revised edition of the Guidelines Manual is to be applied to both
offenses").
82 See GUIDELINE SENTENCING OUTLINE, supra note 81, at 65-70, 73-74 (summarizing in
brief, abbreviated form the holdings of numerous recent cases).
83 See id. at 29-32.
84 See id. at 33-35.
85 See id. at 37-39.
86 See id. at 56-59.
87 See id. at 65-67, 68-70 (role), 80-82 (special skill), 87-88 (concealment).
88 See id. at 57-58.
89 See id. at 59-61.
90 See id. at 73.
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defendant had such a relationship with others, such as nonvictim share-
holders, constituents, or employers?91
-When and how should the court "group" multiple counts of conviction
on firearms offenses (and how should the court account for timing, pur-
pose, place, and types of weapons used)? 92
-When should money laundering and fraud counts be "grouped" under
the Guidelines' multiple-count rules? 93
-Does a burglary constitute a "crime of violence" for purposes of ap-
plying the upward adjustments that are mandatory in the sentencing of
"career offenders"? 94
-How do the terms "crime of violence" and "controlled substance of-
fense" in Guidelines section 4B1.1 differ from "violent felony" and "se-
rious drug offense" in the federal statute relating to enhancement of
sentence for defendants previously convicted of such crimes? 95
For the uninitiated, the most powerful evidence of the tedious-
ness and complexity of sentencing in the Guidelines regime would be
provided by a perusal of one of the many compendiums of appellate
sentencing case law and other Guidelines updates published by both
the Sentencing Commission and the Federal Judicial Center, as well as
by academic and commercial enterprises.96 These summaries-often
listing in the briefest form the holdings of thousands of cases-are
necessary, of course, because no federal judge, prosecutor, probation
officer, or defense counsel could possibly have the time to read and
make sense of the appellate sentencing opinions that may be relevant
to a particular case. The compendiums are a monument to the effort
that federal judges across the nation have devoted to applying the
often unexplained, if not arbitrary, rules promulgated by the Sentenc-
ing Commission-an effort which, lamentably, is squandered in the
obscure.
91 See id. at 76-78.
92 See id. at 97.
93 See, e.g., United States v. Mullens, 65 F.3d 1560, 1564 (11th Cir. 1995).
94 See GUIDELINES SENTENCING OUTLINE, supra note 81, at 122-23.
95 See id. at 130. Compare U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (1995) with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1994). See
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 application note 1 (1995) (the meaning of the term is not the same).
96 Examples are GUIDELINE SENTENCING OuTLINE, supra note 81, the "Guideline Grape-
vine" printed semi-annually by the Library of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, and the Vera Institute's quarterly journal, Federal Sentencing Reporter. Leading trea-
tises on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines include ROGER C. HAINE, JR., ET AL., FEDERAL
SENTENCING & FoRFErruRE GUIDE (3d ed. 1996) and THOMAS W. HUTCHINSON & DAVID YEL-
LEN, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW & PRACTICE (1989). The Commission itself publishes annually
(1) the Guidelines Manual, incorporating all amendments to the Guidelines, (2) an Annual Re-
port which summarizes important case law developments, as well as providing data on sentenc-
ings, (3) a pamphlet entitled "Selected Guidelines Application Decisions," (4) another entitled
"Amendment Highlights," (5) a looseleaf entitled "Most Frequently Asked Questions About the
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Indeed, the weighty volumes of Guidelines jurisprudence
notwithstanding, a federal court rarely has the opportunity to address
issues of just punishment in the context of the case at hand. Neither
the trial courts nor the appellate courts have much occasion to address
questions concerning the appropriate form of punishment (the choice
between probation and imprisonment, for instance) or the appropriate
length of punishment in a particular case. In the explosion of case law
on federal sentencing, there is almost no discussion of the purposes of
sentencing generally or in the specific case-almost no articulated
concern as to whether a particular defendant should be sentenced in
the interests of general deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, or inca-
pacitation. There is usually no reference to the nonquantifiable losses
or pain suffered by victims of the offense; no mention of the experi-
ence, character, values, community and military service, or life accom-
plishments and failures of the defendant; no mention of the sentences
received by codefendants. There is almost no mention of these mat-
ters because, under the Guidelines, judges are simply not allowed to
take them into account (barring "extraordinary" or "atypical" circum-
stances) in pronouncing the defendant's sentence.97
B. The Insignificance of Guidelines Jurisprudence
Even those issues that are potentially of lasting significance be-
come, within the confines of the application of the Sentencing Guide-
lines, trivial and inconsequential. Three aspects of the Sentencing
Guidelines help to ensure their lasting insignificance. First, the Sen-
tencing Commission almost never explains the reason behind a partic-
ular Guidelines rule. Second, in its rules, the Commission has chosen
to invent new terms, and it has altered the meaning of well-established
ones. Third, the Commission has been notably reluctant to permit the
courts to participate in the elaboration of the rules and principles it
promulgates. It is emphatically true, of course-and we have no in-
tention of suggesting otherwise-that the now-discarded system of
fully discretionary sentencing, under which sentences could not be re-
viewed by appellate courts, did not permit the judicial development of
97 See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (Commentary to Policy Statement); §§ 5HI.A-5H1.6, §§ 5H1.9-
5H1.12 (listing factors and circumstances that are irrelevant in most cases). See also United
States v. Ives, 984 F.2d 649, 650-51 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that disparity among co-defendants
not relevant); United States v. Arjoon, 964 F.2d 167, 170-71 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that disparity
among unrelated cases is not relevant); United States v. Frazier, 979 F.2d 1227, 1231 (7th Cir.
1992) (remanding where sentencing court had sentenced to probation on the ground that there
was "nothing to be gained" by imprisonment); United States v. Bruder, 945 F.2d 167, 173 (7th
Cir. 1991) (en bane) (holding that Guidelines' reduction for "acceptance of responsibility" al-
ready takes into account defendant's rehabilitative efforts post-arrest); United States v. Carpen-
ter, 914 F.2d 1131, 1135-46 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that disparity among codefendants is not
relevant).
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sentencing principles and standards. But neither does the Guidelines
regime.
1. The Guidelines as Diktats.-Largely unencumbered by the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act,98 the Sentencing
Commission has not explained its actions or its intentions-beyond
the conclusory statements of its "Resolution of Major Issues" in the
Introduction to its Guidelines Manual. The rules issued by the Com-
mission, whether termed "Policy Statements," "Guidelines," or "Com-
mentary," simply assert that some particular circumstances call for
adjusting sentence length, while some other circumstances do not.
Neither in proposing particular guidelines nor in ultimately promul-
gating them does the Commission explain why it is doing what it does.
The Commission writes the Guidelines, but others-judges, prosecu-
tors, probation officers, and defense attorneys-must implement them
and, when called upon in the performance of their duties, defend
them.
As a result, the Guidelines are simply a compilation of adminis-
trative diktats. A set of unexplained directives may warrant unques-
tioning obedience if they are thought to constitute divine revelation or
its equivalent (the Ten Commandments come to mind), but this is not
a common occurrence in human affairs-at least not in democratic
societies. The Commission's primary argument in support of its
Guidelines is implicitly an argument from authority-that is, the au-
thority for these rules rests on the Commission's authority to issue
98 The Sentencing Reform Act required that the Commission publish proposed amendments
and receive comment on them prior to final promulgation. Sentencing Reform Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(x) (1994). The statute did not, however, impose any of the myriad other procedural re-
quirements that govern most other federal agencies. It was not until the summer of 1996 that the
Commission proposed rules to govern its own internal practices and procedures. See 61 Fed.
Reg. 52,825 (Oct. 8, 1996); 61 Fed. Reg. 39,493 (July 29, 1996). As one noted administrative law
scholar has explained:
The commission does not have a regularized process for accepting or responding to petitions
for the issuance of new guidelines. Its advisory committees do not hold open meetings, and
the commission's own open meetings have not been the locus for all serious policy deci-
sions.... Perhaps the most glaring shortcoming in the federal [sentencing] commission's
process is its "statement of basis and purpose" for final guideline amendments. While most
rulemaking agencies provide thorough explanations of their final rules, including the factual
evidence supporting the rule, and respond to important comments from, opponents, the
Commission's explanations for its final guidelines are strikingly terse and conclusory.
Ronald F. Wright, Amendments in the Route to Sentencing Reform, CRIMINAL JUSTIcE ETHICS,
Winter/Spring 1994, at 58,64; see also Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Admin-
istrative Law Perspective on the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CAL. L. Rnv. 3, 7-23 (1991)
(discussing administrative insulation of Sentencing Commission). Most importantly, whereas the
regulations of other federal agencies may be challenged in court as "arbitrary" or "capricious"
under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994), the Sentencing Commission's Guidelines are immune from
such challenges. See United States v. Lopez, 938 F.2d 1293, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that




HeinOnline -- 91 Nw. U. L. Rev.  1271 1996-1997
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
them. The Commission's reluctance to explain itself to the public
thus leaves us with a set of rules promulgated and enforced ipse
dixit-because the Commission says so. In the absence of some rea-
soned explanation for a particular rule, it is difficult to understand,
much less defend, the rule. Unless there is reason to believe that the
Commission has some unusual capacity to discover important or eter-
nal truths, its argument from authority leaves the Guidelines with lit-
tle or no independent validity or legitimacy.
2. New Concepts, New Confusion.-A second reason that the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines are unlikely to have lasting significance
is that the Sentencing Commission has so often chosen to define or
apply terms differently from the way they are defined in the substan-
tive criminal law, and even to invent entirely new concepts. Many of
the terms employed by the Guidelines appear, at first glance, to em-
body or restate principles that traditionally are relevant to a determi-
nation of criminal liability. But on closer examination, or a review of
their application over time, it becomes clear that the terms are used in
idiosyncratic ways or in ways that are unknown both to the substan-
tive criminal law and to the law of evidence.
For example, the Guidelines define "obstruction of justice" for
the purpose of a sentence enhancement differently-indeed, much
more broadly-than do the federal statutes defining the crime of ob-
struction of justice. 99 Our criminal law has long punished obstruction
of justice, and over the centuries, courts and legislatures have altered
the precise contours of this crime. There is no reason to suppose that
the current definition in federal law could not be improved upon, or
that the current definition is necessarily the best definition for all pur-
poses. It would undoubtedly be possible for a sentencing commission,
or sentencing courts and appellate courts, to reinterpret the concept of
obstruction of justice in a manner that would improve our understand-
ing of the sort of obstructive conduct that deserves to be considered in
sentencing decisions. Such thinking about this behavior and its pun-
ishment would begin with an explanation of why-and to what ex-
tent-a defendant's sentence for a particular crime ought to be
enhanced because of the defendant's additional conduct of ob-
structing justice. Only then would rulemakers be ready to propose a
definition of obstruction of justice for sentencing purposes. Yet there
is no evidence that the Sentencing Commission has ever attempted
any such inquiry. At the same time, because it has adopted a compre-
hensive codification of the meaning of obstruction of justice in its
Guidelines and has decided the precise point value this behavior is
99 Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1516 (1994) with U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (1995) (making "non-ex-
haustive" enumeration of nine types of conduct constituting obstruction within meaning of
Guidelines; the last of these is "conduct prohibited by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1516").
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"worth" in calculating the defendant's sentencing range, the Commis-
sion has effectively preempted the federal courts from undertaking
this sort of inquiry.
Perhaps the most extraordinary conceptual invention of the Com-
mission is the idea of "relevant conduct"-an idea whose significance
looms large in the new sentencing regime. The concept, as it happens,
is novel. Its scope is broader, for example, than the scope of the famil-
iar evidentiary concept of "common scheme or plan,"'100 broader than
the scope of "accomplice liability" in the criminal law,' 0' and different
from that of "conspiratorial liability."'01 2 Courts have had a difficult
time deciphering and applying the Guidelines' principle of "relevant
conduct," with the result that it has been applied in different ways by
the various district courts and courts of appeals across the country. 10 3
The Commission itself found it necessary to amend its relevant con-
duct rules on no fewer than five occasions in a six-year period. 04
In light of the Sentencing Commission's notable reluctance to of-
fer explanations for its various rules, and its decision to adopt new
meanings for traditional common-law terms, it is not surprising that
conflicting interpretation and confusion have characterized the efforts
of the courts to apply the Guidelines. In one two-week period in 1996,
for instance, three different appellate panels gave three different an-
swers to the question of how to calculate a sentence for a witness con-
100 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes... may... be admissible [to
prove] motive, opportunity, intent, plan .... ). Conduct that constitutes a "common scheme or
plan" with the offense of conviction is one type of "relevant conduct" under the Guidelines. See
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2). The term "common scheme or plan" (and the related, but differently
defined, term "same course of conduct") are defined in the application note 9 to the same
guideline.
101 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (extending criminal liability not only to the primary actor,
but also to one who "aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures," or "wilfully causes"
the crime). The Guidelines include as one type of relevant conduct, "all acts and omissions
committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the
defendant" that occurred "during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for
that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense."
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A).
102 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994). The Guidelines include as one type of relevant conduct,
"all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of' criminal activity
"jointly undertaken" with the defendant. Jointly undertaken criminal activity is further defined
as "a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with
others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (1995).
103 See GUIDELINE SENTENCING OUTLINE, supra note 81, at 1-7, 18-19. A Sentencing Com-
mission staff discussion paper on the relevant conduct Guideline reported in 1995 that the Com-
mission's "training staff has found that the relevant conduct guideline has been among the most
troublesome for application and that the guideline's application has been very inconsistent
across districts and circuits." U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, DISCUSSION PAPER: RELEVANT CON-
DuCT AND REAL OFFENSE SENTENCING 5 (1995).
104 The amendments became effective January 15, 1988, November 1, 1989, November 1,
1990, November 1, 1991, and November 1, 1994.
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victed of criminal contempt for refusing to testify at a trial.'05 The
Guidelines provision on criminal contempt (section 2J1.1) directs the
sentencing court by a cross-reference to another section of the Guide-
lines Manual (section 2X5.1), governing "other offenses" not specifi-
cally addressed in the Guidelines. The latter provision, in turn, directs
the court to apply "the most analogous offense guideline." In the
three appellate cases involving recalcitrant witnesses, one panel con-
cluded that the most analogous guideline was that pertaining to "fail-
ure to appear by a material witness" (section 2J1.5, with a base offense
level of six);106 a second panel concluded that the "obstruction of jus-
tice" guideline (section 2J1.2, with a base offense level of twelve) was
most appropriate; 10 7 the third panel concluded that the proper guide-
line was that pertaining to "misprision of a felony" (section 2X4.1,
with a base offense level between four and nineteen depending on the
underlying felony).' 08
The second and third panel opinions were issued only one day
apart, by two different panels of the same court of appeals. And if that
were not quite enough, these two panels were, coincidentally, review-
ing two different sentencing decisions by the same district judge in the
same prosecution. The result was that one appellate panel told the
district judge he was wrong to use the "misprision of a felony" guide-
line to sentence a recalcitrant witness convicted of criminal contempt,
while another panel of the same court told him one day later that he
had been right to do so.109 Confusion of this sort has contributed to
erosion of confidence in the system of criminal sentences and spawned
the small industry devoted to the compilation and explication of the
case law under the Guidelines.
3. The Hegemony of the Sentencing Commission.-The massive
effort of both trial and appellate courts to make sense of ambiguities,
inconsistencies, and gaps in the Guidelines is of little lasting value to
the bar, the bench, or the public. This is so because the Commission
has gone out of its way to make it clear that it alone will determine the
scope and application of concepts employed in the Sentencing Guide-
lines, regardless of any teachings of the substantive law of crimes or
the experience of federal and state governments in elaborating the
criminal law. The Commission's adamant refusal to share interpretive
105 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1994).
106 United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 980 (7th Cir. 1996) (decided on May 24).
107 United States v. Versaglio, 85 F.3d 934, 949 (2d Cir. 1996) (decided on June 3).
108 United States v. Cefalu, 85 F.3d 964, 969-70 (2d Cir. 1996) (decided on June 4).
109 Ultimately, the district judge was affirmed in both cases. After the opinions in Versaglio
and Cefalu were issued, the defendant sought rehearing in the former case, while the govern-
ment sought rehearing in the latter case. Both panels reconsidered the issue, and, three months
later, the Versaglio panel withdrew its judgment and opinion, and issued a new decision consis-
tent with Cefalu. United States v. Versaglio, 96 F.3d 637 (2d Cir. 1996) (on rehearing).
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authority with the judiciary accounts, in part, for the complexity of the
Guidelines. The Commission deliberately employed minute quantita-
tive distinctions in the Guidelines precisely in order to minimize the
opportunity for sentencing judges to make discretionary judgments." 0
The Commission has also sought to minimize opportunities for the
appellate courts to contribute their perspectives on the meaning of
key Guidelines principles and terms. When the courts of appeals have
interpreted provisions of the Guidelines in ways that would enhance
the authority of district judges to exercise their informed judgment, or
differed among themselves in interpretation of particular language in
the Guidelines, the Commission has almost invariably responded by
promulgating a "clarifying" amendment to bring the appellate courts
back into line-thereby cutting off any possibility of longer-term judi-
cial development of sentencing law."' According to a staff report, the
Commission by 1994 had issued twenty-nine such amendments.11 2 As
one federal appeals judge (a former chief federal prosecutor in New
Jersey) has explained, "the Commission, through the amendment pro-
cess, is now performing with respect to the guidelines essentially the
same role that the Supreme Court plays with respect to the interpreta-
tion of other federal laws. ' '" 3 Unlike the Supreme Court, however,
the Commission does not seek to explain or justify its resolution of
confficts." 4 The Supreme Court has welcomed the Commission's ef-
fort to reduce circuit confficts,"15 a practice that regrettably also
110 The Commission proceeded on the assumption that the Sentencing Reform Act prohib-
ited any exercise of judicial discretion beyond the choice of the final sentence within the Guide-
line range. See Catharine M. Goodwin, Background of the AO Memorandum Opinion on the
25% Rule, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 109 (1995) (reporting that Commission was convinced that
the Sentencing Reform Act's "25% Rule," see 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2), applied to entire guideline-
calculation process, thus requiring that the Guidelines define the exact degree of each sentencing
factor warranting an additional one-point adjustment in offense level or criminal history score).
111 See William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, The Role of Sentencing Guideline Amend-
ments in Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 63,74-75 (1993).
There may be much merit in not attempting to resolve circuit conflicts as soon as they arrive.
The merits of "percolation" rather than immediate resolution of inter-circuit conflicts were
noted by the FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 44, at 124. Such an approach permits
different circuits to try out different resolutions of an ambiguous or difficult area of law and
permit several circuits to consider such an issue before it is definitively resolved.
112 U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Office of Gen. Counsel, Circuit Conflicts Addressed by Com-
mission Amendment (May 2, 1994) (unpublished report, on file with authors).
113 Samuel Alito, Reviewing the Sentencing Commission's 1991 Annual Report, 5 FED. SEN-
TENCING REp. 166, 168 (1992).
114 See Douglas A. Berman, The Sentencing Commission as Guidelines Supreme Court: Re-
sponding to Circuit Conflicts, 7 FED. SENTENCING REP. 142 (1994); Steven E. Zipperstein, Cer-
tain Uncertainty: Appellate Review and the Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 656
(1992).
115 See Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 347-49 (1991); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing
Law in the Supreme Court's 1990-91 Term, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 58, 58 (1991).
1275
91:1247 (1997)
HeinOnline -- 91 Nw. U. L. Rev.  1275 1996-1997
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
reduces the role of the appellate courts and the Supreme Court itself
in giving meaning to the Guidelines.
It is perhaps ironic that the most coherent and sensible jurispru-
dence under the new sentencing regime concerns not application of
the Guidelines, but a certain type of departure from the Guidelines.
Although the Commission has insisted that certain factors may never
be a basis for departure (including the defendant's socio-economic
status), has discouraged departure on other bases (including the de-
fendant's disadvantaged background or military or civic service), and
has specifically encouraged departure for yet other reasons, it has not
sought to address exhaustively or comprehensively all the possible
grounds for departure from its Guidelines. This has afforded the
courts a limited role in determining the factors that are relevant to a
just sentence, both generally and in specific factual contexts. In the
chapter on departures, the Guidelines list eleven grounds warranting
an upward departure from the calculated Guidelines sentence," 6 and
five grounds supporting a downward departure." 7 Additionally, the
guidelines on criminal history 1 8 and on obstruction of justice," 9
among others, specifically note that further adjustment (beyond the
points specified in the Guidelines instruction) may be warranted if es-
pecially mitigating or aggravating circumstances are found. 120 Some
of these Commission-identified grounds for departure are derived
from, and are closely analogous to, concepts that have long played an
important role in determining substantive criminal liability-including
mens rea, self-defense, duress, justification, and diminished capac-
ity.121 Moreover, in a break with their usual approach, the Guidelines
do not quantify the precise effect that the presence of one of these
factors should have on the defendant's sentence. Rather, the Guide-
lines leave to the sentencing judge in the first instance, and to the
appellate court on review, the task of fleshing out the meaning and the
significance for punishment in each of these circumstances. Appellate
opinions explaining, limiting, justifying, and applying these Commis-
sion-identified grounds of departure are among the most thoughtful
and significant of the genre.' 22 These decisions discuss issues of culpa-
116 U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.1-5K2.8, 5K2.15.
117 Id. §§ 5K2.9-5K2.13.
118 Id. § 4A1.3.
119 See id. § 3C1.2 application notes 2 & 6.
120 Several guidelines in Chapter 2 of the Guidelines Manual, which instructs the sentencing
court on how to calculate the defendant's "base offense level," also explicitly or implicitly invite
departures on particular grounds. See, e.g., id. § 2A6.1 application note 1 (noting that the
"Threatening Communicaton" guideline deals with wide range of conduct and that "[f]actors not
incorporated" expressly may be a basis for departure).
121 See U.S.S.G. §§ 3A1.2(b), 3C1.2, 5K2.10-5K2.13.
122 See, e.g., United States v. Merritt, 988 F.2d 1298, 1305-11 (2d Cir. 1995) (permitting up-
ward departure for defendant's "profound corruption and dishonesty" and "fraudulent manipu-
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bility and just punishment in the particular case, often drawing upon
the substantive criminal law as it has developed in statutes and at
common law through the years.
Both sentencing judges and appellate courts have contributed a
coherent sentencing jurisprudence primarily with respect to this lim-
ited set of "guided departures.' 23 With respect to departures that
are based on a circumstance specifically countenanced by the Com-
mission, appellate courts have often been bogged down by considera-
tion of a threshold issue: whether the ground cited by the trial court
as a basis for departure has already been factored into the Sentencing
Guidelines. 24 As we discuss in the next Part, the case law here is thus
speculative and trivial, addressing not whether a particular circum-
stance is relevant to just sentencing, but simply whether the Sentenc-
ing Commission can be said to have already considered the particular
circumstance. That is, most jurisprudence concerning departure from
the Guidelines, like most jurisprudence concerning application of the
Guidelines, is useful for only one purpose: interpreting the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.
IV. THE PRIMACY OF THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AFTER KooN
Some observers have expressed the hope that the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Koon v. United States125 may permit both
sentencing judges and appellate courts to consider fundamental issues
of culpability and just punishment in deciding whether there should be
a departure from the Guidelines. In Koon, the Court unanimously
lation ... designed to preserve" monetary gains of crime); United States v. Fan, 36 F.3d 240,246-
47 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming upward departure for "obstruction of justice" by perjury); United
States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506 (9th Cir. 1993) (considering Post Traumatic Stress Disorder as
mental disorder which can support downward departure); United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894
(9th Cir. 1992) (Noonan, J.) (considering partial duress as a mitigating factor warranting depar-
ture); United States v. Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989, 995-96 (3d Cir. 1992) (affirming downward
departure for post-conviction conduct evincing acceptance of responsibility); United States v.
Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 583-84 (1st Cir. 1991) (permitting upward departure for "cool, delibera-
tive, calculated" planning regarding terrorist weapons and threat to national security), cert. de-
nied, 506 U.S. 816 (1992).
123 We use the term "guided departure" to refer to all instances where the Commission identi-
fies a ground that may be an appropriate basis for departure, upward or downward. The Com-
mission itself uses this term more narrowly-to refer to those few instances in which the
Guidelines both identify a ground for possible departure and recommend the amount of a depar-
ture through precise quantitative specification or by cross-referencing another guideline. See
U.S.S.G. § 1A4(b) (discussing "guided departures").
124 See, e.g., United States v. Hendrickson, 22 F.3d 170, 175 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
209 (1994); United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1149 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Cherry, 10
F.3d 1003, 1010-12 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Kelly, 1 F.3d 1137, 1139-41 (10th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 342 (1994); United States v. Castro-Cervantes, 927 F.2d 1079, 1081-82 (9th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1116 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Mc-
Dowell, 902 F.2d 451, 453-54 (6th Cir. 1990).
125 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996).
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adopted the notion that the Sentencing Guidelines govern "heart-
land" cases, and that judges may depart in cases outside the "heart-
land." The "heartland" concept had appeared only in a single
sentence in the introductory chapter of the Guidelines when they
were issued in 1987,126 but in 1994 a reconstituted Commission added
a new paragraph expressly recognizing the concept in the chapter of
the Guidelines governing departures. 127
Potentially more significant than its embrace of the "heartland"
concept, Koon held that departures should be reviewed by appellate
courts under an "abuse-of-discretion" standard. 128 Moreover, Koon
seems to suggest that sentencing courts will be given significant defer-
ence when they decide to depart; it says, for instance, that "the district
court retains much of its traditional discretion," and that "[a] district
court's decision to depart from the Guidelines ... will in most cases be
due substantial deference."'1 29 A cursory reading of the Court's deci-
sion in the Koon case may reinforce the media's misimpressions of the
decision-that the Supreme Court has appeased district judges by giv-
ing them more discretion and mollified circuit judges by relieving
them of much of the burden of Guidelines appeals. 130
Yet despite Koon's expansive dicta regarding the scope of sen-
tencing court discretion, federal appellate courts have not generally
recognized the decision as granting sentencing judges greater depar-
ture authority.' 3 ' In Koon's wake, many circuits have continued to
126 U.S.S.G. § 1A4(b) ("The Commission intends the sentencing courts to treat each guideline
as carving out a 'heartland,' a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline
describes. When a court finds an atypical case.., the court may consider whether a departure is
warranted.").
127 The new language of section 5K2.0 provides: "An offender characteristic or other circum-
stance that is not ordinarily relevant ... may be relevant to [departure] determination if such
characteristic or circumstance is present to an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the
'heartland' cases covered by the guidelines .... In accompanying commentary, the Commis-
sion said that it "believes that such cases [justifying departure on the basis of 'ordinarily' not
relevant characteristics] will be rare."
128 116 S. Ct. at 2035.
129 Id. at 2046.
130 See, e.g., Koon Decision: Mere Lip Service to Sentencing Discretion?, Crim. Prac. Man.
(BNA) 285, 289 (1996).
131 Chief Judge Richard Posner has noted that Koon did not mention, in its recitation of the
statutory requirements for departure, the requirement that departure be "consistent" with the
broad goals of criminal punishment listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1994). United States v.
Pullen, 89 F.3d 368, 370 (7th Cir. 1996). Whether this lack of citation by the Supreme Court is
properly characterized as "reject[ing] this limitation on sentencing discretion," as Judge Posner
asserts, see id., or whether Koon only inadvertently failed to quote this language, will have to
await further clarification. In any event, it would be strange, to say the least, for the Supreme
Court to purport to authorize judges to depart in ways that defeat the statutory purposes of
sentencing. It also may be noted that Judge Posner does not appear to read Koon as increasing
departure authority in any other way. Id. at 371-72.
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subject departures to close scrutiny.132 The truth is that Koon itself is
a puzzling decision; its pronouncements on the extent of deference
due to sentencing judges133 are difficult to reconcile with the reason-
ing and holdings stated elsewhere in the decision.
In our view, a thorough and candid assessment of Koon compels
the conclusion that the decision has not changed matters significantly,
and perhaps not at all. Surprisingly, neither the "heartland" concept
nor Koon's articulation of an abuse-of-discretion standard provides a
relaxation of the rigidities of the Guidelines regime. This is so be-
cause Koon leaves intact the major obstacle to meaningful judicial
participation in criminal sentencing: the prevailing interpretation of
the provision of the Sentencing Reform Act prohibiting departure on
grounds already "adequately" considered by the Commission. 34 The
Supreme Court in Koon followed the lead of the federal courts of ap-
peals in treating any consideration by the Commission as, ipso facto,
Cases that do read Koon as increasing discretion to depart include United States v. Sablan,
114 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 1997) (6 to 5 en banc panel) (holding that appellate court must deferen-
tially review extent of departure); United States v. Galante, 111 F.3d 1029 (2d Cir. 1997) (permit-
ting downward departure on basis of defendant's family responsibilities). See also United States
v. Beasley, 90 F.3d 400 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that Koon had overruled circuit law that
required two-part departure inquiry-legal questions under de novo standard of review, and
factual questions under "clear error" standard; then conducting inquiry consistent with both
Koon and circuit's previous standards), and United States v. Joost, 92 F.3d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1996)
(upholding upward departure on the basis specifically identified by Commission as warranting
upward departure; but also citing the deference language of Koon).
132 See, e.g., United States v. Barber, 93 F.3d 1200, 1204 (4th Cir. 1996) ("In sum, where the
conduct in question is either typical of the offense of conviction or irrelevant to that offense, the
district court must accept that the Commission has implicitly taken that conduct into account-
insofar as Guidelines philosophy permits it to be taken into account at all-and thus eliminated
such conduct as grounds for departure"); United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d 754, 758 (4th Cir.
1996) ("While we review this ultimate departure decision for abuse of discretion, . . . if the
court's departure is based on a misinterpretation of the Guidelines, our review of that underlying
ruling is de novo."); see also United States v. Charry Cubillos, 91 F.3d 1342 (9th Cir. 1996)
(ordering remand on departure, holding that under Koon district court must make inquiry into
"structure and theory of Guidelines" and bear in mind Koon's repetition of Commission's expec-
tation that departures on grounds not invited by Commission will be "rare"); United States v.
Lewis, 90 F.3d 302, 304, 306 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Koon for proposition that departure relied on
error of law and thus was "by definition" an abuse of discretion); United States v. McNeil, 90
F.3d 298 (8th Cir. 1996) (declining to give deference to district court's decision that criminal
history calculation was not adequate); United States v. Taylor, 88 F.3d 938 (11th Cir. 1996) (af-
firming upward departure on grounds specifically identified by Guidelines as possibly warranting
upward departure; quoting Koon at length without suggesting it had changed effective standard
of review); United States v. Weinberger, 91 F.3d 642, 644 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Weise,
89 F.3d 501 (8th Cir. 1996) (ordering remand over partial dissent on ground that Koon requires
more deference to district court than recognized by majority).
133 See 116 S. Ct. at 2046 (asserting repeatedly that the Guidelines leave district courts with
"much" or a "substantial" portion of their "traditional ... sentencing discretion").
134 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994) (permitting judge to depart on own motion only if "there
exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission").
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"adequate" consideration. 135 Because no second-guessing of the
Commission is permitted, sentencing judges and appellate courts are
denied authority to consider the arbitrariness of any rule in the Guide-
lines themselves. In the words of one recent decision by a federal
appellate court, Koon does nothing to alter the rule that "[a] sentenc-
ing court may not depart from an otherwise applicable guideline range
simply because its own sense of justice would call for it."' 136 The ques-
tion of whether the applicable Guidelines calculation or sentencing
range produces justice in a particular case is not open for considera-
tion either by sentencing courts or appellate courts.
In the wake of Koon, as before Koon, the main question on ap-
peal of a departure continues to be whether the Sentencing Commis-
sion had already taken into account the circumstances that the
sentencing judge has identified as warranting departure in the particu-
lar case.137 And the sentencing court's answer to this question-
whether the Sentencing Commission has already considered these fac-
tors-is not subject to deferential review. To be sure, at one point
Koon states that district courts have "an institutional advantage over
appellate courts" in deciding questions such as "[w]hether a given fac-
tor is present to a degree not adequately considered by the Commis-
sion, or whether a discouraged factor nonetheless justifies departure
because it is present in some unusual or exceptional way."'138 Yet in
unpacking this complex inquiry, Koon gave deference to the sentenc-
ing court only on the question of which factors are present in the case
at hand, not on the question of whether the Commission had already
taken that factor adequately into account-that is, not on the question
of what constitutes the "heartland" case. Indeed, Koon explicitly reaf-
firmed the rule that reviewing courts should consider de novo (that is,
without deference) the "legal conclusions" that a district court makes
in asserting departure authority, and reminded that "[a] district court
by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law."'1 39
135 See 116 S. Ct. at 2052-53 (stating that because Commission already took factor into ac-
count, sentencing court "abused its discretion" by considering that factor).
136 Barber, 93 F.3d. at 1203.
137 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
138 116 S. Ct. at 2046-47.
139 Id. at 2047. See also id. at 2048 ("1he abuse of discretion standard includes review to
determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.").
Moreover, in Koon, the Court quoted at length and adopted as its own the multi-pronged
inquiry that then-Judge Breyer had set forth in United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942 (1st Cir.
1993). In deciding whether to depart, Judge Breyer had written, the sentencing judge should
consider:
(1) What features of this case, potentially, take it outside the Guidelines' "heartland" and
make of it a special, or unusual, case?
(2) Has the Commission forbidden departures based on those features?
(3) If not, has the Commission encouraged departures based on those features?
(4) If not, has the Commission discouraged departures based on those features? ....
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Koon makes clear that the reviewing court must defer to a departure
decision only if the circumstances identified by the district judge take
the case out of the "heartland" (that is, if the circumstances have not
already been factored into the Guidelines). 140
As it happens, the Sentencing Commission has already consid-
ered, and the Sentencing Guidelines have already factored in, many if
not all circumstances that are arguably relevant to criminal sentenc-
ing; this micro-management is one of the Guidelines' most notable
features. The Guidelines have done so by prohibiting altogether the
consideration of some factors141 and by specifying the weight to be
accorded other significant factors depending on the degree to which
they are present. 42 The Guidelines are, as Congress intended them to
be, comprehensive, 43 and Koon makes clear that judges may not de-
part because they disagree with these comprehensive sentencing in-
structions. Judges may not depart because they disagree with the
weight the Guidelines give to a circumstance in the typical case, or
simply because they disagree with the Commission's prohibition of
consideration of certain factors.
Moreover, with respect to commonly occurring circumstances
that are not explicitly addressed by the Guidelines, Koon teaches that
the benefit of the doubt must be given to the Commission; it must be
assumed that the Commission has already taken the matter into ac-
Id. at 949, quoted in 116 S. Ct. at 2045. All but the first of these are entirely legal, not factual,
inquiries. The Supreme Court went on to quote Rivera's further language concerning factors
"unmentioned" in the Guidelines: "[(5)] [Tlhe [sentencing] court must consider[ ] the 'structure
and theory of both relevant individual guidelines and the Guidelines taken as a whole' [to] de-
cide whether [the factor] is sufficient to take the case out of the Guideline's heartland." 116 S.
Ct. at 2045 (quoting 994 F.2d at 949). Consideration of "structure and theory" surely suggests a
largely legal inquiry.
140 116 S. Ct. at 2052 (stating that a factor present to an extent considered by Commission
does "not take the case out of the heartland").
141 See, e.g., U.S.S.G. §§ 5H1.4 (excluding alcohol or drug dependence as reason for down-
ward departure), 5H1.1O (excluding race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socio-eco-
nomic status), 5H1.12 (excluding lack of guidance as a youth and disadvantaged upbringing)
(1995).
142 Among the prominent factors thus considered by the Commission are the presence or
absence of a criminal record, the defendant's role in the offense, the quantity of harm, and
whether the defendant has accepted responsibility for the crime. See also U.S.S.G. §§ 5H1.1
(age ordinarily not relevant), 5H1.2 (educational and vocational skills ordinarily not relevant),
5H1.5 (employment record ordinarily not relevant), 5H1.6 (family or community responsibilities
ordinarily not relevant); 5H1.11 (military, civic, charitable, or public service ordinarily not
relevant).
143 See United States v. Weinberger, 91 F.3d 642, 644 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Given the comprehen-
sive sentencing structure embodied in the guidelines, '[o]nly rarely will we conclude that a factor
was not adequately taken into consideration by the Commission."') (quoting pre-Koon Fourth
Circuit cases); see also Stith & Koh, supra note 1, at 246-47.
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count. 44 After Koon, as before, the fundamental question of whether
the Commission has taken a particular circumstance into account is
not only a legal question on which no deference is due the trial judge;
it is also a question that must be addressed in a highly abstract and
speculative way. The real question is not whether the Commission
actually took some factor into account, but rather, whether the factor
is rare enough to overcome a presumption that the Commission has
indeed taken it into account.
Koon thus leaves sentencing courts approximately where they
were: with departure authority only in cases that are "atypical" in
ways neither proscribed from consideration by the Sentencing Com-
mission nor already considered by the Commission. Koon also leaves
appellate courts approximately where they were: with supervisory re-
sponsibility to invalidate departures based on anything other than the
"atypicality" of the case at hand. There is no room to question the
reasonableness of the Commission's judgments about just punishment
in the "typical" (or "heartland") case, and no room to review any de-
termination the Commission has made regarding the proper, or im-
proper, grounds for departure from the Guidelines ranges. 145
The hegemony of the Sentencing Commission remains intact.
V. CONCLUSION
The traditional sentencing ritual reflected our society's belief that
the justification of punishment rests ultimately on a moral judgment
about an individual. The new regime inadvertently mocks the moral
premises upon which the traditional ritual was based, while denying
both sentencing judges and appellate judges the opportunity to de-
velop a principled jurisprudence. As one supporter of the present re-
gime has explained, "The whole point of the guidelines was to hem in
district courts with a set of rules created by the Commission and en-
forced by the courts of appeals."'1 46 In order for this regime of com-
prehensive sentencing rules to function effectively, the defendant
must be reduced to an "inanimate variable" in an equation;147 the pro-
bation officer must operate as the "special master" of Guidelines
facts;148 the sentencing judge must weigh the crime according to the
Sentencing Commission's calculus; and the role of the courts of ap-
144 116 S. Ct. at 2052 (stating that a factor relied on by the sentencing court "is to be expected
.. so we conclude these consequences were adequately considered by the Commission").
145 See United States v. Pullen, 89 F.3d 368, 371 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The Supreme Court in Koon
emphasized the primacy of the Commission over the courts in determining the proper grounds
for departures from the guidelines ranges.").
146 Frank 0. Bowman, III, Places in the Heartland: Departure Jurisprudence after Koon, 9
FED. SENTENCING REP. 19, 19 (1996).
147 Weinstein, supra note 28, at 365-66.
148 See Bowman, supra note 33, at 732.
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peals is simply to police the sentencing judges. Without principled
foundation or application, the awesome power of the state to inflict
suffering is wielded as an exercise in bureaucratic regularity for which
no one, ultimately, bears responsibility.
Justice has sometimes been represented by the blindfolded icon,
Justicia.149 This ancient metaphor is appropriate for adjudication. In
deciding guilt or innocence, it ought not to matter whether the de-
fendant is rich or poor, nor whether the defendant has erred in the
past, or suffered unusual disadvantages, nor even whether the defend-
ant is likely to break the law again. The decision on guilt or innocence
is properly blind to these circumstances, blind to everything but the
question of whether the defendant's actions and accompanying mental
state instantiate the abstract features specified in a criminal statute.
The character of this determination is represented by the icon's scales.
Essentially a matter of weighing evidence and determining facts, the
process of adjudication has more in common with scientific than with
moral reasoning.
But Justicia usually is depicted also holding a sword, representing
not the power to determine guilt or innocence, but the power to pun-
ish. Before that power is exercised, before the sword is raised, Justicia
must raise the blindfold. 150 When it comes to the imposition of pun-
ishment, the question is always one of degree. The need is not for
blindness, but for insight, for equity, for what Aristotle called "the
correction of the law where it is defective owing to its universality,"' 51
and this can only occur in a judgment that takes account of the com-
plexities of the individual case.
149 See 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 326 (2d ed. 1989) (describing Justicia as "often rep-
resented in art as a goddess holding balanced scales or a sword, sometimes also with veiled eyes,
betokening impartiality"); Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L.J.
1727 (1987).
150 See Curtis & Resnik, supra note 149, at 1728 (quoting Professor Robert Cover: "The
temptation to raise the blindfold may be... the temptation to see-to overcome the elusiveness
of indirection.").
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